


**MIT Interdisciplinary Consortium for Improving  
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity – (IC)<sup>3</sup>**



# **Cyber Safety: A Systems Thinking and Systems Theory Approach to Managing Cyber Security Risks**

Presented at the International Conference on  
Computer Security in a Nuclear World: Expert  
Discussion and Exchange, International Atomic  
Energy Agency, June 2, 2015, Vienna, Austria



**IAEA**

International Atomic Energy Agency

*Atoms for Peace*



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**Dr. Qi Van Eikema Hommes, Lecturer & Research Affiliate  
Hamid Salim**

**Stuart Madnick, Professor**

**Michael Coden, CISSP, Associate Director MIT-(IC)<sup>3</sup>**



**MIT Sloan  
MANAGEMENT**

# Presentation Outline

- (IC)<sup>3</sup>
- Research Motivations
- Approaches
  - System-Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)
    - Causal Analysis based on STAMP (CAST)
    - System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA)
- Case Study
  - CAST Applied to the TJX Case
  - CAST Applied to Stuxnet
- Future Research Directions



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# (IC)<sup>3</sup> is a Shared Research Consortium


**Each member contributes to the annual research budget**  
**All members share in the tools, models, methods,  
processes and procedures developed**

**Join (IC)<sup>3</sup> at <http://ic3.mit.edu>**



# Research Motivations

## Cyber to Physical Risks With Major Consequences



Source: Hitachi



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### DHS: Hackers targeted the grid 79 times this year

By Gavin Rade | November 18, 2014

- share
- tweet
- post
- email



#### Dive Brief:

- There were 79 hacking incidents at energy companies in fiscal 2014 investigated by the Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT), a division of the Department of Homeland Security, CNN Money reports. There were 145 the previous year.

### U.K. Power Grid is Under Attack From Hackers Every Minute, Says Parliament

By James Wood | Sep 9, 2015 12:50 PM ET

The U.K. government is one step ahead of hackers trying to turn off the country's lights -- for now.

The prospect of cyber-attacks on the nation's power network is a major threat to the country's security, according to James Arbuthnot, a member of parliament who chaired the Defense Select Committee until last year. He plans to visit **National Grid Plc (NG7)** next month to discuss the issue.

"Our National Grid is coming under cyber-attack not just day-by-day but minute-by-minute," Arbuthnot, whose committee



### Most Violent Cyber Attack Noted To Date: 2008 Pipeline Explosion Caused By Remote Hacking




Reporting by [Julian Robinson](#) and [Michael Gray](#) in Birmingham, in building new



# System Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP)


Professor Nancy Leveson analyzes industrial accidents including Citichem Oakbridge, Challenger disaster, etc., developing STAMP:

- Modeling the effects of complex system interactions by:
- Hierarchical Layers of Actuators/Controls and Sensors/Feedback
- Including the role of human actions and decisions as a part of the whole system




# Typical Industrial or Cyber Incident Investigation Model


Investigation  
usually stops  
when a  
human error  
is found



# Add Maintenance and Evolution Layers




# Add Project Management and Operations Management Layers







# Add Company Management Layer



# Add State, Federal, Regulatory Layers



# Generic Control Model



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# The Approaches

**STAMP** = System Theoretic Accident Model  
And Processes

- 1. CAST: Causal Analysis using System Theory**
  - Prove the model by looking backwards
- 2. STPA: System Theoretic Process Analysis**
  - Apply the model looking forward for incident prevention

# CAST Systematic Analysis Process



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
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<b>1</b>	<b>System and hazard definition</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>System level safety/security requirements</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>Draw hierarchical control structure</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>Proximate events</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>Analyze the physical system</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Moving up the levels of the control structure</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>Coordination and communication</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>Dynamics and change over time</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>Generate recommendations.</b>



# STPA Systematic Incident Prevention Process



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# TJX (TJ Maxx & Marshalls) Case Study

- TJX is a US-based major off-price retailer.
  - Revenues > \$25 billion (FY2014)
- Victim of largest (by number of cards) cyber-attack in history, when announced in 2007.
- Cost to TJX > \$170 million, per SEC filings.
- Cyber-attack launched from a store on Miami, FL in 2005 by exploiting Wi-Fi vulnerability.
- Hackers ultimately reached corporate payment servers and stole current transaction data.
- Cyber-attack lasted for over 1.5 years (According to the US ICS-CERT, based on all reported ICS cyber-attacks, the average time that cyber-attackers were inside the ICS system before being discovered was 243 days.)

Sources: Federal/State Court records (primary), TJX SEC Filings, Others (NYT, WSJ, Globe, FTC, Academic papers, Journal articles). ICS-CERT Oral Presentation, ABB Automation & Power World, March, 2015

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# CAST Step 1: Identify System and Hazards

- ***System***
  - TJX payment card processing system
- ***Hazards – at system level***
  - System allows for unauthorized access to customer information

1	System and hazard definition
2	System level safety/security requirements
3	Draw control structure
4	Proximate events
5	Analyze the physical system
6	Moving up the levels of the control structure
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9	Generate recommendations.





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
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# CAST Step 2: Define System Security Requirements

- Protect customer information from unauthorized access.
- Provide adequate training to staff for managing security technology infrastructure.
- Minimize losses from unauthorized access to payment system.

1	System and hazard definition
2	System level safety/security requirements
3	Draw control structure
4	Proximate events
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# Cast Step 3: Hierarchical Control Structure



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


# Proximal Event Chain

1	System and hazard definition
2	System level safety/security requirements
3	Draw control structure
4	Proximate events
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
# Breaching Marshalls' Store

1. AP- Open authentication vs Shared Key authentication.
2. WEP publically known weak algorithm compromised.
3. Sniffers used to monitor data packets.
4. Hackers steal store employee account information and gain access to TJX corporate servers.




# Hackers Establish VPN Connection

1. Hackers use Marshalls AP to install VPN connection.
2. VPN is between TJX corporate server and hacker controlled servers in Latvia.
3. Code installed on TJX corporate payment processing server.
4. No longer using TJX network



# Flow for Sales of Stolen Payment Card Information


Hackers are selling credit card data for almost 1.5 years



# Analyzing the Physical System

1	System and hazard definition
2	System level safety/security requirements
3	Draw control structure
4	Proximate events
5	Analyze the physical system
6	Moving up the levels of the control structure
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# Cast Step 5: Analyzing the Physical Process (TJX Retail Store)



- Legend:**
- Each **number** indicates a unique loop.
  - Bold-dashed **square** indicates TJX system boundary.
  - Bold-dashed **oval** indicates the physical system.
  - **Downward arrow** represents reference channel for imposing safety constraints.
  - **Upward arrow** represents feedback channel and reports the effectiveness of constraints.



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


# Cast Step 5: Analyzing the Physical Process (TJX Retail Store)

## Four Key Areas:

1. Safety Requirements & Constraints
2. Emergency & Safety Equipment
3. Failures & Inadequacy
4. Physical & Contextual Factors

- **Safety Requirements and Constraints**
  - Prevent unauthorized access to customer information.
- **Emergency and Safety Equipment**
  - Wi-Fi network Access Point (AP) authentication
  - Wi-Fi encryption algorithm
- **Failures and Inadequacy**
  - Retail store Wi-Fi AP misconfigured
  - Inadequate encryption technology – WEP decrypting key were freely available on the internet.
  - Inadequate monitoring of data activities on the Wi-Fi .
- **Physical & Contextual Factors**
  - Early adopter of Wi-Fi
  - Learning curve and training



**Legend:**

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# Analyzing the Control Structure



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
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# Step 6: Analysis of Higher Levels of the Hierarchical Safety Control Structure

## Payment Card Processing System



### Legend:

- Each **number** indicates a unique loop.
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
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# Step 6: Analysis of Higher Levels of the Hierarchical Safety Control Structure

## Payment Card Processing System


- **Safety Requirements and Constraints**
  - Prevent unauthorized access to customer information.
- **Emergency and Safety Equipment**
  - Payment card data is encrypted during transmission and storage
  - Conform to Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS)
- **Failures and Inadequacy**
  - Payment data briefly stored and then transmitted unencrypted to the bank.
  - Not compliant with PCI-DSS.
  - Fifth Third Bancorp had limited influence on TJX



- **Physical Contextual Factors**
  - PCI-DSS is not legally required by States (except for NV) and Federal Government.
  - Fifth Third Bancorp has no regulatory role


Upward arrow represents feedback channel and reports the effectiveness of constraints.

TJX System Development and Operations



State Legislature

- PCI-DSS is a law in the State of Nevada, but not in Massachusetts where TJX is headquartered.
- TJX a creates jobs and generates tax revenue in Massachusetts.




Step 6:  
Analysis of  
Higher  
Levels of  
the  
Hierarchical  
Safety  
Control  
Structure

State  
Legislature

- Legend:
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# Step 6: Analysis of Higher Levels of the Hierarchical Safety Control Structure

## Regulatory Agencies: FTC, SEC, etc.



Federal Regulatory agency:

- Most Cyber Security standards are voluntary and are written broadly.
- At the time of the attack, no regulation existed for the overall retail industry.

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# Coordination and Communication



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
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# Step 7: Coordination and Communication



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
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# Step 7: Coordination and Communication



Lack of coordination for PCI-DSS Compliance

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


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# Step 7: Coordination and Communication



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


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# Step 7: Coordination and Communication



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
for IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE CYBERSECURITY



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
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# Step 7: Coordination and Communication

## TJX System Development and Operations



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# Dynamic Migration to High Risk State



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# CAST Step 8: Dynamics and Migration to a High-Risk State

- Initially cyber security risk was low because vulnerabilities were unknown to everyone – experts, businesses, and hackers.
- Flaws in managerial decision making process.
  - Information availability: recent experiences strongly influence the decision (i.e., no break-ins so far.)

# CAST Step 8: Dynamics and Migration to a High-Risk State (Cont.)

*“My understanding is that we can be PCI-compliant without the planned FY07 upgrade to WPA technology for encryption because most of our stores do not have WPA capability without some changes. WPA is clearly best practice and may ultimately become a requirement for PCI compliance sometime in the future. **I think we have an opportunity to defer some spending from FY07’s budget by removing the money for the WPA upgrade, but would want us all to agree that the risks are small or negligible.**” – TJX CIO, Nov. 2005*

- Above is a message from CIO in November 2005 to his staff, requesting agreement on his belief that cyber security risk is low.
- There were only two opposing views, a majority of his staff agreed.
- **This confirmation trap led to postponing upgrades.**





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# Comparison of Results from FTC and CPC Investigations and STAMP/CAST Analysis

No.	Recommendation	CPC	FTC	STAMP /CAST
1	Create an executive level role for managing cyber security risks.	No	*	Yes
2	PCI-DSS integration with TJX processes.	No	No	Yes
3	Develop a safety culture.	No	No	Yes
4	Understand limitations of PCI-DSS and standards in general.	No	No	Yes
5	Review system architecture.	No	No	Yes
6	Upgrade encryption technology.	Yes	No	Yes
7	Implement vigorous monitoring of systems.	Yes	No	Yes
8	Implement information security program.	No	Yes	Yes

CPC = Canadian Privacy Commission


FTC = Federal Trade Commission

\* = Indicates recommendations that are close to STAMP/CAST based analysis but also has differences.

# Research Contributions

1. Highlighted need for systematic thinking and systems engineering approach to cyber security.
2. Tested STAMP/CAST as a new approach for managing cyber security risks.
3. Discovered new insights when applying STAMP/CAST to the TJX case.
4. Recommendations provide a basis for preventing similar events in the future.
5. The US Air Force has successfully implemented, and is implementing STPA as a cyber security measure
6. STAMP/CAST/STPA is compatible with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, UK Cyber Essentials, IEC-62443 and other Cybersecurity standards

# Application to Cyber Physical System (Stuxnet Example)



# Future Research Directions

- Continue applying CAST for Cyber Security attack analysis and generate comprehensive list of recommendations that include:
  - Improvements to mitigate technology vulnerabilities
  - Ways to address systemic issues related to management, decision making, culture, policy and regulation.
- Apply the System Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) approach to identify system vulnerability prior to an attack.
  - (IC)<sup>3</sup> has started a project to ensure the cyber security of complex power grids, working with major grid operators in the US, Dubai, and Singapore.

# MIT Interdisciplinary Consortium for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity – (IC)<sup>3</sup>



## Questions?



**IAEA**

International Atomic Energy Agency

*Atoms for Peace*

**Michael Coden, CISSP, Associate Director MIT-(IC)<sup>3</sup>**  
**mcoden@mit.edu**  
**<http://ic3.mit.edu>**